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U THE SUPRi~XE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------- ----~-----) 
!lO\JARD V. DRAKE: , ) 
) 
Plaintiff and Respondent,) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
PAT CLARK, ) 
) 
Defendant and Appellant. ) 
______________ ) 
BRIEF OF RESPONDEN'l 
Case lfo. 15162 
STATEMENT OF KI~D OF CASE 
The action filed by the Plaintiff against the 
Defendant, in its First Cause of Action, alleges the existence 
of a partnership between Plaintiff and Defendant, and demands 
an accounting. T~e Second Cause of Action sounds in frauds; 
the Third Cause of Action seeks unpaid wages due to Plaintiff 
from Jefendant; the Fourth Cause of Action sounds in unjust 
enrichment; while the Fifth Cause of Action is one for 
rcplevin. The matter is before the Supreme Court on interlocu-
tory appeal, the appeal being brought by Defendant, who 
clai;;is error in the Order of the lower court. 
DISPOSITION IN LO\VER COUR'l' 
The fifth Judicial District Court for \Vashington 
County denied !)efendant' s "Notion to Quash Service of Process 
-1-
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~ 
and to Order Jisrniss;1l o[ t:omnL1inL ;ind First:\ 
r - 1 r:-1cncic'd Cc-· 
finding that failure to properly serve sun:>1•ons upon 
within one ycJr of the Jal(' of fLlin;', Lhc Cc·r.1plain:_ 
J·urisdictionJl in nJture, \.'l1l.'rc ikfl'ndanL w d' as cva ing 0 ~. 
of process. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON /\PPEi\L 
-------~~---------~~ ----
Defendant and /\ppellant CLARK seek:; n•vcr:oal o'. 
the lower court's Order. PlainLif[ and Rc>spondc11t seeks. 
affirmation of the same Order. 
STATEMEl~T OF FACTS 
\ 
I 
On or about 23 January 1976, process was sent t: 
Court of Washington County, naming CLARK as Oef~ndailt (?,, 
1). CLARK 'vfoS scrvcci with process in Las Vegas, iievadd,, 
27 January 1976 (R. 11). The serving officer failed to 
endorse on the copy of the summons delivered co Ci.,AKK chc 
date of service or Lhe serving offict.or' s signature: (R l1' 
On 17 February 1976, vefendcmt CLAt<.K filed a "Motion to 
Quash Service of Process" (O{. 12-15). On 23 .february 19i, 
process was again sent Lo the Clark County Sheriff to re· 
serve PAT CLARK, but the summons sent for :;l!cvice lacked 1 
time in which answer was required (R. 19). 
0'1 L3 M2y 1976, i)cft.ondant CLi\Rl<. 1·1c1s again serw' 
with process (iZ. 18). CLM~i<. filed a :.JoL i_o11 t:c Qudsh Josee 
-2-
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upon the L1ct that the summons failed to set forth the 
number of days in which he had to answer the Complaint (R. 
20). Service was quashed by order of the lower co~rt on 17 
June 1976 (R. 24). 
0;:-i 3 December 1976, Plaintiff, as a matter of 
right, pursuant to U.R.C.P. 15, filed his First Amended 
Complaint (R. 25). 
CLARK was served with a copy of the First Anended 
Complaint and summons on 11 February 1977, in Las Vegas, 
Nevada (R. 3Lf). On 9 March 1977, CLARK filed a "Motion to 
Quash Service of Process and to Order Dismissal of Complaint 
and First Amccnded Complaint" (R. 36). Th'is motion was heard 
on 11 April 1977, and was overrul2d and denied. CLARK was 
given 20 days in uhich to answer the First Amended Complaint 
(R. 44). A written order to that effect was signed on 25 
April 1977 (R. 45). 
Other than the 3 instances of service upon Defendant 
CLARK, the record shows 16 other visits by nembers of the 
Clark County ShC'riff' s Department to Defendant CLAR~(' s home 
and place of business, and at least one visit by the Washington 
County Sheriff to Defendant's ranch in Utah, all in effort 
to serve Defendant CLARK. The record also shows numerous 
attempts by counsel for Plaintiff to get the United States 
Marshal and private process servers to accomplish service 
(R. 38-42). 
JC' fondant CLAIUZ now appeals the order of the 
-3-
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District Court overruling ;111d denying hi:; "~·lotion to Quas0 
Service of Process and to Order Dismissal of Complaint a"d 
First Amended Complaint". 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
DEFE;~DANT' S "MOTION TO QLlASH SERVICE OF 
PROCESS AND TO ORDER DISi'!ISSAL OF COi!PLAim 
A;'lD FIRST AMENDED C0:-1PLAINT" FOR Tl!E REASONS 
Tl!AT (1) DEFENDAi~T CLARK WAS PROPERLY St::RVED 
WITHIN THE TIME REQUIRED BY LAH, (2) THE 
PROVISION OF U.R.C.P. 4(b) APPLICABLE llERE 
IS NOT JURISDIC'iIONAL BU'1 PROCEDURAL HJ 
NATURE, Ai'JD (3) DH:t::~DANT CLARK BY RC:ASON 
OF HIS CONDUCT IN EVADING SERVICE OF PROCESS 
CAl'li'lOT NOW BE HEARD TO Cot!PLAHI CONCERlHi~G 
THE TH1E REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH SERVICE uro;~ 
Hrn. 
U.R.C.P. 4(b) states: 
"If an action is commenced by the filiDs of J 
co1,1plaint, summons must issue t:lwreon \>lithin 
tlirc'c 1.10nths from the date of filin;;. The surn:"o:. 
rw1:-: 1: ht2 served wiLhin one year afLer thL'. filirig 
of the complaint or the action will be d~em~ 
dismissed, provided that in any action brought 
aga i.nst two or more defendants in which personal 
service has been obtained upon one of them withir 
the year, the other or others may be served or 
appcar at any time before trial." 
( 1) D::: fendan t CLARK claims thil t because Pl a inti:: 
amended his complaint and issued summons on 1 December 19;:,, 
which complaint and summons were served upon Defendant c;x: 
on 11 February 1977, that the service should be quashed, 
based upon the wording of U. R. C. P. 4 (b) . It is clear that 
the wording of the rule does not support Def211dant 's claim. 
The rule provitles that the summons must issue within 
filonths of the date of filing of the compLtint. The record 
-if -
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before the court shows that a summons did in fact issue 
within 3 months from the date of the filing of the complaint. 
The wording of the rule also provides that a summons raust be 
served within 1 year after the filing of the complaint, and 
Defendant claims that this wording is a basis for quashal 
and dismissal. If the court were to adopt Defendant's 
contention, it would be ruling that no complaint could ever 
be amended if it were to be amended in such a manner that the 
amended complaint could not be served within 1 year of the 
filing of the complaint. This is clearly beyond the meaning 
or the intent of U.R.C.P. 4(b). 
It is obvious from the wording of U.R.C.P. 4(b) 
that the Utah Supreme Court, in adopting the rule, merely 
r.icant to prevent a dilatory plaintiff from allowing an 
action to lie al rest without proceeding upon the same. In 
this case, the record shows in excess of 20 attempts to 
accomplish service upon Jefendant, and shows that the entire 
year following the filing of the original complaint was 
spent in diligent effort by Plaintiff attempting to serve 
Defendant CLAP.K, who has patently attempted to evade service 
of process upon him, in derogation of the dignity and authority 
of the courts of the State of Utah. Equity, justice and 
good sense dictate that U.R.C.P. 4(b) not be interpreted to 
bar a diligent plaintiff. 
Further, Plaintiff having amended his complaint on 
3 December 1976 to show Defendant's correct county of residence, 
-5-
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-...,. 
it was physically impossible to issue a summons to 1. • equ1r. 
Defendant to appear and answer such First Amended Cor , ~p '<ll" 
before the amendment took place. Defendant's col n ·cntiun, 
logically, would require that Plaintiff issue a summons 
first amended complaint prior to knowing that there 1" 15 , 
need to amend the complaint. A proper interpretation ot 
U.R.C.P. 4(b) would be to read it as follows, underli~~ 
words being added to the text of the rule: 
"If an action is amended by the filing of 
an amended compL1inr,-summons must issue 
thcrcoi1WTthin three months from the date of 
such filing. The: summons r;iust be servc:d 
within one year after the filing of the 
amc:nded complaint or the action will be 
Cicemed-dismissed, providc:rl that in CJny 
action brought against two or more defc11dants 
in which pc:rsonal service has been obtained 
L1pon one of thc:m within the year, the other 
I 
or others may be served or appear ;:it any time , 
before trial." ) 
Underlined words added to show proper .interprekj 
I 
of U.R.C.P. 4(b). 
Since sunm1ons issued within 3 months of the fib 
of the First Amended Complaint, <.md since service of such 
summons and first AiJ1ended Complaint occurred within 1 year 
of the filing of the First ./\mended Complaint, service upoi, 
Defendant CLARK was timely. 
i 
Defendant CLARK claims that the provision o: I (2) 
U.R.C.P. 4(b) here applicable is jurisdictional in nature. 
Such is not the case. .i\lthough this court has in so~ 
instances deemed other provisions of U.R.C:.P. L1(b) to be 
-6-
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jurisdictional in nature, a reading of all such cases clearly 
shows that such holdings were based upon the failure of the 
plaintiffs in those cases to diligently pursue the various 
actions ruled upon. In this case, Plaintiff has been more 
than diligent in his efforts to obtain service of process 
upon Defendant CLARK, and the length of time required to 
serve Defenciant CLARK was the direct result of CLARK's 
evasion of service of process, and not any delay on the part 
of Plaintiff. 
Further, the wording of U.R.C.P. 4(b) shows that 
this court did not intend to mandatorily dismiss an action 
where service upon a defendant was accom~lished more than 1 
year following the filing of the complaint. T~e wording is 
that the action "will be deemed dismissed", not that the 
action "shall be dismissed". There are no cases interpreting 
the wording quoted, and there is no similar federal rule to 
which we might look for further interpretation. However, 
upon its face, the use of the words "will be deemed" seems 
to suggest that the Clerk of a trial court may merely deem 
the action dismissed for his record keeping purposes. Such 
ruling would favor the hearing of an action upon its merits, 
rather than permitting Defendant CLARK to avoid appearing 
before a court of the State of Utah to answer for his delicts. 
Defendant CLARK's contention that this action 
should be dismissed in the lower court, if adopted, would 
totally invalidate the statutes of the State of Utah with 
-7-
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respect to limitation of actions. CL/\.RK' s contentio" . 
"ls 
that there is an automatic one-yc';ir statute of lirn1· t· t' 
· a lee' 
upon any cause of action once a cor.~pLiint has been filcc. 
If service did not take place within a vear of fil' 
, ing of: 
cowplaint, CLARlZ contends that the action i.s invalid, 
to the judgment and decision of the Utah State LegisLiturc, 
which has, in many cases and in this case, provided for 
limitations upon actions far in excess of the one-year 
period which Defendant's contention would require the Cour 
to adopt. 
In vie1v of all of the foregoing, it is clear th;:\ 
the provision of U.R.C.P. 4(b) here applicable is proccduL) 
not jurisdictional in nature. 
(3) In any event, Defendant CLARK should be 
barred and eslopped from 
be dismissed and service 
claiming that this action should I 
of process quashed, by reason of I 
said Defendant's own wrongful conduct in purposely evading 
service of process upon him. CLARK should be estoµped frc: 
claiming that more than one year had passed between t~ 
filing of the complaint and service of process upon him. 
POI8T II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DEI~YidG 
DEFENDANT'S "MOTIOH TO QUASH SERVICE OF 
PROCESS AND TO ORDER DIS11ISSAL OF 
COMPLAINT AND FIRST AME;:-.JDED COMPLAINT" 
FOR THE REASO~ THAT DEFENDA~T PAT CLARK 
VOLU8TARILY SUBmTTED HIMSELF TO THE 
JURISDICTION OF TiIB COURTS OF THE STATE 
OF UTAH AND SHOULD THEREFORE BE RiNlJirlliD 
TO ANSWER THE FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT. 
-8- i 
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Defendant CLARK asserts that he appeared before 
the courts of the State of Utah solely for the purpose of 
contesting jurisdiction. Such statement would be true if 
there had been filed solely a motion to quash. The only 
prop2r remedy available where a special appearance is sought 
to be made is a motion to quash. Defendant CLARK did not 
choose to make a special appearance before the lower court 
solely to contest the jurisdiction of said Court, but went 
further, made a general appearance, and sought to have the 
entire action dismissed, including the complaint and first 
amended complaint, which is relief much more extensive than 
simple quashal of process. 
CLL\RK's filing of his "Motion to Quash Service of 
Process and to Order Dismissal of Complaint and First Amended 
Complaint" constituted a general appearance which submitted 
CLARK to the general jurisdiction of the trial court for all 
purposes. In the case of Barnato v. Second Judicial District 
Court, 353 P.2d 1103 (Nev. 1960), the ~evada Supreme Court 
considered whether or not the filing of a motion to dismiss 
constituted a general appearance. ~evada has adopted the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, with some modifications, 
as has Utah. Under wording almost exactly that of the Utah 
rules, the Nevada Supreme Court held that the defendant wife's 
filing of a motion to dismiss because of lack of jurisdiction 
over her person, lack of sufficiency of process, and insufficiency 
of service of process, constituted a general appearance 
-9-
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involving the general jurisdiction of the tri;1l court, 
did not constitute a special appearance. 
Utah has specifically recognized and hdd Lil:i~. i 
filing of a motion to dismiss constiLutcs a 0,cner•l I 
, ~ ap,,J; I 
since such a motion invokes the power of the court to t;r,:.:i 
relief on other than jurisdictional grounds. Sec Ric~.3__';~, 
Wade, 97 Utah 402, 93 P.2d 479 (1935), involving a divorc. 
action in which a non-resident d'-'fenc.Lrnl, after having L 
I 
! 
served with process outside of Utah, movc.:<l to quasi1 s~rvic,I 
of process but at the same time requested a dismissal of; 
cause, thereby entering a general c.ppearancc and submitc:r. l 
himself voluntarily to the jurisdiction of Lhc court. Af,! 
see Clawson v. Boston Acme ;--!ines Dcvel~_!l~C:.12~-~~~Pa!11.· 
72 Utah 137, 269 P. 147, 59 A. L. R. 1318. The facts inc:. · 
case are very sfr1ilar to those involved in _[Zick~, abo•.rc. I 
Here, CLARK \''JS served outside the State of Utah. He fiLI 
a motion to quash, and also to dismiss. 
dismiss is an invocation of the gener;il 
courts of the State of Utah, and CLARK 
The motion to 
jurisdiction o[ tc·.\ 
has therefore vul·J.: .. 
I 
entered an appearance before the same. Such being the ca;, 
the trial court did not err in overruling and denying WX'. 
motion to dismiss. 
POINT III 
IN THE EVt:NT THIS COURT REVERSES THE TRIAL 
COURT AND ORDERS THE CASE REMANDED FOR 
DIS1\ISSAL, THIS COURT SHOULD REQUIRE THAT 
SUCH DISMISSAL BE WITHOUT PREJUDIO:. 
-10-
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U.R.C.P. 4(b) cannot be construed to be a court-
adopted provision negating the statutes of limitations 
passed by the Utah State Legislature. Defendant's contention 
is that the entire matter should be dismissed. If it is 
dismissed, such dismissal should be without prejudice, and 
Plaintiff should be specifically permitted to refile and 
reserve Defendant, because a ruling in the nature of a 
dismissal with prejudice would, in effect, negate the statutes 
of limitations applicable to Plaintiff's various causes of 
action. Further, U.C.A. 78-12-LfO (1953, as amended) states: 
"If any action is commenced within due time 
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff is 
reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in such 
action or upon a cause of action otherwise 
than upon the merits, and the time limited 
either by law or contract for commencing the 
same shall have expired, the plaintiff, or if 
he dies and the cause of action survives, his 
representatives, may commence a new action 
within one year after the reversal or failure." 
The Utah State Legislature having expressed its 
policy that actions which do not fail upon the merits should 
not be barred, this Court should affirm the trial court's 
order, but failing that, should remand the case to the trial 
court for dismissal without prejudice, in order to allow 
Plaintiff to refile the action, and reserve Defendant CLARK. 
co;'1CLUSION 
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial 
court, and remand this matter to the District Court for 
further proceedings. However, in the event that this Court 
-11-
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reverses the ruling of the trial cuurL, the matter should 
rernunded to the trial court for a dismissal without preju: 
DATED: 1 August 1977. 
Rcspcctfull/ submitted, 
HORt.At;~ j/f 
By i~lJJZi.~l, __ (\_.i~~ 
-C Attorneys for l!lairiilli 
und Respo11dent · 
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